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PROTECTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
VICTIMS UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW'S PROVISIONS
PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF DISABILITY
Marta B. Varela*

INTRODUCTION

The problem of "domestic violence" - the term that has come
to describe violence directed at women perpetrated by their intimate partners - is a vexing one for the legal system, whether
under a criminal or civil law framework. Until recently, most states
did not convey to police officers called to the scene of a domestic
dispute the authority to take the perpetrator into custody on the
strength of circumstantial evidence of "wife battering," as the behavior is also known. For example, in Duluth, Minnesota, only after a concerted campaign by feminist activists in 1982 did the city
entrust police officers with that authority by instituting a
mandatory arrest policy for misdemeanor assaults - the criminal
charge filed in most domestic violence cases.1 When it instituted
the mandatory arrest policy, Duluth was the first jurisdiction in the
2
fifty states to do so.
New York State instituted a mandatory arrest policy in 1996. 3
The definition of family under the governing Family Court statute, a
however, is narrower than that utilized by the police department of
the City of New York and the five District Attorneys' offices. As a
result, the latter definition includes more potential perpetrators.
* Chair and Commissioner of the New York City Commission on Human
Rights. B.A., Harvard-Radcliffe College, 1977; J.D., Fordham University School of
Law, 1985; LL.M., Fordham University School of Law, 1994. The opinions expressed
herein are the sole responsibility of the author, and are not a statement of either
agency or mayoral policy.
The author wishes to thank Professor Russell G. Pearce of the Stein Center for
Ethics and Public Interest Law for bringing together the Fordham Urban Law Journal
and the Commission on Human Rights, whose combined efforts led to the Civil
Rights in Transition Symposium held on December 8, 1999.
1. See Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at 23.
2. See id.
3. See N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 140.10(4) (McKinney 1998).
4. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 812(1) (McKinney 1998).
5. See N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 140.10(4).
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Domestic violence is a crime against women that is not committed by a stranger, but that is, by its very definition, a crime perpetrated by a person with whom the victim is on intimate terms.6
Like sexual harassment, domestic violence is a manifestation of
one person's desire to dominate and control another, rather than
the outgrowth of strictly sexual phenomena between two persons. 7
Domestic violence is a contemporary crime that, due to the historically chattel status of women in many countries (including many
"modern" ones), was traditionally not a crime."
Conventionally viewed as a problem affecting primarily the
poor, 9 domestic violence has been redefined as a problem that af6. See
ANYONE:

OLGA W. BARNETT & ALYCE
WHY BATERED WOMEN STAY

D. LAVIOLETTE,
at xvi (1993).

IT COULD HAPPEN TO

7. See id. at xxi.
8. See R. EMERSON

DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES:
A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 56-57 (1979); Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights for
Battered Women: Axiomatic and Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 22-26 (1992). From
the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, "there was little objection within
the community to a man's using force against his wife as long as he did not exceed
certain tacit limits." DOBASH & DOBASH, supra, at 56-57.
Community tolerance of such behavior was great indeed. A woman could
be beaten if she behaved "shamelessly" and caused jealousy, was lazy, unwilling to work in the fields, became drunk, spent too much money, or neglected the house. The community agreed that these were offenses that
merited, even required, punishment as long as the physical force was restricted to "blows, thumps, kicks or punches on the back if they leave no
lasting traces."..... It was the moderate use of physical punishment that separated the "reasonable husband from the brute."

The violence could be quite severe before the community would take collective offense and even then they might not intervene but only express disapproval because to intervene directly was to interfere in the private sphere of
family life, which was the rightful arena of the patriarch. The community's
stance then, as today, permitted women to be continually subjected to the
most extraordinary degree and forms of physical abuse.
Id. at 56-57 (footnotes omitted). Further, Dobash and Dobash also stated that:
[i]n the case of marital chastisement, the husband's traditional right to beat
his wife, established under English and European law, was neither confirmed nor denied in the United States. That omission, however, was eventually remedied. In 1824 wife beating was made legal in Mississippi. Court
cases in several other states reaffirmed the traditional right of a man to beat
his wife and did so in language identical to that of the English common law.
Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
9. See Lenore E. A. Walker, Foreword to BARNET & LAVIOLETTE, supra note
6, at vii ("In the early 1970s, when I first became aware of battered women, it was
clear that the average person, even the average professional, believed it only happened to poor, passive women with lots of children and little education."); see also
Baracebridge Hemyng, Thieves' Women, in 4 LONDON LABOUR AND THE LONDON
POOR: A CYCLOPAEDIA OF THE CONDITION AND EARNINGS OF THOSE THAT WILL
NOT WORK, COMPRISING PROSTITUTES, THIEVES, SWINDLERS AND BEGGARS 236,
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fects women from all strata of the socio-economic ladder. 10 In its
reconfigured state, the problem of domestic violence has become
the object of new scrutiny by lawmakers.11 These lawmakers are
wrestling with the question of whether current provisions of the
criminal law that apply to domestic violence perpetrators go far
enough to stanch those societal attitudes that may abet its spread. 2
In New York City, prompted by advocates for domestic violence
victims, members of the City Council of the City of New York have
proposed legislation, Introduction No. 400 ("Int. No. 400"), 13 to
amend the New York City Human Rights Law prohibiting employment discrimination by adding domestic violence victims to the
14
city's list of thirteen protected classes.
This Article analyzes the need to create a new protected class in
order to shield domestic violence victims from workplace discrimination. Part I provides general background on domestic violence.
Part II presents the terms and implications of Int. No. 400 to section 8-107 of the New York City Administration Code (the
"Human Rights Law") governing disability. Part III analyzes the
arguments for and against Int. No. 400. Part IV presents the new
revision of the proposed legislation embodied in Introduction No.
400-A ("Int. No. 400-A"), 15 and analyzes the changes made in the
new draft. This article concludes that the proposed legislation is an
unnecessary piece of legislation because the Human Rights Law's
provision prohibiting discrimination based on disability already
236-39 (Henry Mayhew ed., 1968) (providing a concrete example of how the problem
is typically viewed).
10. See generally BARNETT & LAVIOLETTE, supra note 6.
11. See Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
12. See id. at 43-44.
13. See Draft of Introduction No. 400 (introduced Aug. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Int.
No. 400] (proposing an amendment to section 8-107 of the New York City Administration Code introduced by the Public Advocate, Mr. Green, and Council Members
Eldridge, DiBrienza, Leffler, Cruz, Boyland, Marshall, Duane, Robinson, Freed,
Henry, Linares, Lopez, Perkins, Pinkett and Reed, as well as Council Members Carrion, Clarke, Eisland, Fisher, Foster, Koslowitz, Michels, Miller, Quinn, Rivera and
Sabini, which was referred to the Committee on General Welfare).
14. See id. Presently, there are 13 protected classes under the New York City
Human Rights Law. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (1996). They are "actual or
perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender, disability, marital status,
sexual orientation or alienage or citizenship status or any person." Id.
15. See Draft of Introduction No. 400-A (introduced Jan. 26, 2000) [hereinafter
Int. No. 400-a] (proposing an amendment to Section 8-107 of the New York City Administration Code introduced by the Public Advocate, Mr. Green, and Council Members Eldridge, DiBrienza, Leffler, Cruz, Boyland, Marshall, Robinson, Freed, Henry,
Linares, Lopez, Perkins, Pinkett and Reed, as well as Council Members Carrion,
Clarke, Eisland, Fisher, Foster, Koslowitz, Michels, Miller, Quinn, Rivera and Sabini).
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provides substantial protection to domestic violence victims and
without requiring that victims disclose their domestic violence status to the employer.
I.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BACKGROUND

The more we know about domestic violence, the more the phenomenon emerges as a complex welter of psychosocial phenomena.
A recent article in the New York Times indicates that one-quarter
of arrests for domestic violence assaults are of women. 6 While this
does not indicate that men are victims in one-quarter of all domestic violence cases, it does suggest that some female victims of domestic violence are also perpetrators of domestic violence.
Extrapolating from the New York Times article, three-quarters
of all domestic violence victims are women. Whether the woman is
guilty of violence or the object thereof, however, blaming the victim is not an option. Questioning whether the complex problems
of domestic violence victims could be ameliorated by creating a
protected class for them, however, is.
Under the broad definition contained in Int. No. 400, "victims of
domestic violence" not only can be sexually intimate partners, but
also can be family members whose intimate relationship is not a
sexually intimate one. 7 While battered spouse syndrome is usually
associated with male-female relationships, heterosexuals do not
have a lock on the pathology.18 There is lesbian and gay partner
battering, and undoubtedly transgender partner battering, as
well. 19 In other words, if the relationship is intimate, the possibility
of violence is more likely than in any other type of relationship."0
16. Carey Goldberg, Spouse Abuse Crackdown, Surprisingly, Nets Many Women,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at A16.
17. See Int. No. 400, supra note 13, § 2. A "victim of domestic violence" is defined
as:
a person who has been subjected to acts or threats of violence, not including
acts of self-defense, committed by a current or former spouse of the victim,
by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person
who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim, by a person who is
or has been in continuing social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature
with the victim, or a person who is or has continually or at regular intervals
lived in the same households as the victim.

Id.
18. See Symposium, Queer Law 1999: Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283, 315-26 (1999).
19. See id.; see also Angela West, ProsecutorialActivism: Confronting Heterosex-

ism in a Lesbian Battery Case, 15
20. See

DOBASH

L.J. 249 (1992).

HARV. WOMEN'S

& DOBASH, supra note 8, at 17.
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After all, as the history of homicide bears out, most murders are of
victims who knew their killer well, often, very well.21
Stalking, also, is a form of intimate violence, although it springs
into being after the woman has taken steps to withdraw from a
partner with the intention of ending the relationship. 22 These terrible threats to a person's life merit our compassion and tap into our
capacity to be empathetic. It seems appropriate to ask, then,
whether the law is well suited to the task of bringing comfort to the
sorely-tested domestic violence victim.
Barnett and LaViolette describe domestic violence as a dynamic
phenomenon that demonstrates that:
battered women have learned to endure abuse and remain in
their unhealthy relationships ....Experiences that cause stressinduced symptoms in other populations (e.g., Vietnam veterans)
can be likened to the experiences of a battered woman. She is a
human being responding to a crisis brought on by abuse, and her
response is like the response of other human beings who experience similar intense and/or prolonged trauma.23
Community outreach to the battered woman can undoubtedly be
a sustaining source of the will to break with the pattern of violence.
If the woman is working, employers are a logical point of contact
for information about domestic violence victim services offered by
social service agencies, such as Victim Services or a battered women's shelter. Educating employers as to their ability to keep valued employees who are domestic violence victims by facilitating
contact with these agencies is certainly imperative. Nonetheless,
employers do not wish to be punished for not being social workers,
and any scenario that punishes them for not taking an active interest in their employees' personal problems will surely generate an
outcry by employers. Whether punishing employers can be a progressive response to employee problems whose after-effects may
disrupt workplace operations is, therefore, open to question.
Many ask, why do domestic violence victims remain in abusive
relationships? Barnett and LaViolette quote earlier research by
Barnett and Lopez-Real that "quantified several reasons that battered women stay in abusive relationships that fall under the rubric
of attachment: (a) 'You loved your partner'; (b) '[Y]ou thought you
would feel lonely without your partner'; (c) '[Y]ou were afraid to
21. See id. at 15-17.
22. See MARIAN BETANCOURT, WHAT To Do WHEN
(1997).
23. BARNETT & LAVIOLETrE, supra note 6, at xxvi.

LOVE TURNS VIOLENT

90-92
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live without a man.' ",24 These beliefs are, for those caught up in
them, compelling rationales for self-destructive behavior. They
also suggest just how difficult the presence on the staff of an employee who is being victimized by domestic violence can be for an
employer. If an employee identifies herself as a domestic violence
victim and an employer accommodates her as such by, for example,
acceding to accommodation requests that ostensibly should provide the employee with a feeling of safety during the workday,
what can the employer do when the employee returns to the partner who battered her? Nothing. What will the employer do when
on account of her return to the batterer her work suffers, or she
misses work, or the sudden presence of her partner around lunch
hour becomes a source of anxiety for the employer, whose fears
now extend beyond his battered employee to himself and his other
employees?
If terminating an employee who presented the fact pattern outlined above constituted discrimination against a domestic violence
victim and a violation of the Human Rights Law, the protections
afforded domestic violence victims would in effect trounce an employer's prerogative to control his workplace by punishing him after he made an accommodation after which the employee was
unable to perform the essential functions of the job.
Such an interpretation of the parameters of a "domestic violence
victim" protected class may seem outlandish. Nevertheless, if domestic violence victims are to be afforded protection qua domestic
violence victims rather than as members of a class of persons disabled by domestic violence, it seems inevitable that not only domestic violence victims with documented disability claims, but
domestic violence victims who cannot get away from the batterer
must be accommodated by the employer.
A.

Domestic Violence Scenarios

The problem of domestic violence would be easier to address if it
was limited to case studies of women who had been victimized by
domestic violence and, with the benefit of accommodation by their
employers, were able to break the cycle of violence, pick up their
lives and go on to a violence-free future. The research about domestic violence does not, unfortunately, indicate that a majority of
24. Id. at 4 (quoting OLA W. BARNETT & D. I. LOPEZ-REAL,
To BATTERING AND WHY THEY STAY (1985)).

TIONS

WOMEN'S REAC-
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domestic violence victims track that uplifting scenario. A few examples suffice to make the point:
1. Scenario #1: Case History -

Karen and Michael

Michael Connell visited his estranged wife Karen and their son
Ward. Karen and Michael had been separated for more than a
year but were seeing each other again. A friend of Ward's was also
visiting and the four of them were going on a picnic. They never
made it.
At around noon, Karen staggered from the house, bleeding
profusely from the neck. She collapsed into a neighbor's arms,
gasping that her husband had stabbed her and was still in the house
with their 5-year old son and his friend.
The South Pasadena Police arrived on the scene to investigate. After several attempts to make contact with Michael or the children
failed, they contacted the L.A. Sheriff's SWAT team. The SWAT
team, using a bullhorn, requested that anyone inside the house
come out.
Two boys walked out of the house with their hands up, pleading,
"Don't shoot; we're the good guys." The SWAT team forced entry
into the house at about 3:00. They found a man lying on the bathroom floor. He had massive slash wounds to his neck area and a
stab wound to his chest. The wounds were self-inflicted. Michael
Ward Connell was dead.
At the same time, Karen was undergoing an operation at Huntington Memorial Hospital. She had lost seven pints of blood, and her
vocal cords had been severed. Her young son Ward had saved her
life by jumping on his father's back and hitting him, screaming,
"Don't hurt my Mom!"
The coroner's report stated, "Decedent apparently had marital
problems with his wife for quite some time." Karen and Ward had
been residents of Haven House, a refuge for battered women and
Karen had been a memtheir children. At the time of the attack,
25
ber of their outreach counseling group.
2. Scenario #2: A Scottish study
From a Scottish study, in which a mother recounts her
experience:
25. See

BARNETT

&

LAVIOLEITTE,

supra note 6, at xiv-xv.
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Oh yes, they've seen me be hit. He used to delight in lifting them
up out of their beds so that they could watch.
And this was 2 A.M. and he sat on the chair and sat and told me
everything he thought about me and he dragged the full three kids
out their beds and made them all sit. He lined them right up
against the couch and told them all what I was. He says to them,
"Now you see her, she's a whore." And he'd say to Chris, "See
her, she's a cow." And the baby was only months old, and he'd say
to him, "See her, she's no good. She's dirt. That's what women
are. They're all dirt. There's your daddy been out working all day
and there's no tea ready for him. See how rotten she is to your
daddy." And all the babies were dragged out of their beds for no
reason at all.26
3.

Scenario #3: Drinking

Drinking often prompted the violence, but there were certainly
times when he was sober. I know he loved me, and sometimes he
was able to say it or show it, but the violence is what defined our
relationship.
I began secretly saving money from each paycheck and opened my
own bank account. I went to the library to research divorce. It
took me three years to get out, to find a secure job and a place I
could afford to live, and provide care for my children. During
those three years my husband continued to threaten and abuse me.
One afternoon, while he lingered at a neighborhood bar, I stole
away with my children and a suitcase.
He demanded that I bring his children back or he would not support them. He stalked the home I now shared with another woman
and her three children. (We worked rotating shifts, so one of us
was always home with five children.) He stood outside at night
watching, making sure I would not go out with another man. Was
he out there with a gun? I did not feel safe leaving my house. He
had often bragged threateningly about his hidden guns. Many
years later my son confirmed that he indeed had at least two guns
hidden in the basement."

26. See
27. See

DOBASH

&

supra note 8, at 151.
supra note 22, at xxii-xxiv.

DOBASH,

BETANCOURT,
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Analysis of Scenarios

These three scenarios illustrate the ugly diversity of domestic violence. They also illustrate that each woman's experience of domestic violence - and her responses to it - will not be identical.
This also makes the task of identifying "how the employer discriminated" against the domestic violence victim a dizzying one for lawyers and judges.
Aside from considering the difficulties of determining, as a legal
matter, exactly what employer conduct consisted of discrimination,
the potentially negative psychological consequence of the victim's
revealing to her employer that she identifies herself as a domestic
violence victim inhabiting psychic space somewhere along the spectrum described in the three scenarios above is also worth considering. Why couple that identity with a demand based upon a claim of
right that the employer do something she asks? Why, if her physical and psychological injury on account of domestic violence is already provided for in a high degree of specificity under the
disability law, is it necessary to overlay onto it a new, "domestic
violence victim" protected class, fraught as its addition will be with
analytical difficulties unbalanced by a significant, corresponding
benefit for the domestic violence victim?
II.

THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW'S DISABILITY
PROVISION AND INTRODUCTION No. 400

A.

The Human Rights Law Disability Provision

The Human Rights Law contains a provision that protects
against unlawful discriminatory practices in the employment setting.2 8 In pertinent part, this provision states:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [flor an employer ... because of the actual or perceived age, race, creed,
color, national origin, gender, disability, marital status, sexual
orientation or alienage or citizenship status of any person, to
refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such person or to discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.2 9
For purposes of this section of the statute, "disability" is defined as
"any physical, medical, mental or psychological impairment, or a
history or record of such impairment."3 ° The phrase "physical,
28. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (1999).
29. Id. § 8-107(a).
30. Id. § 8-102.16(a).
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medical, mental, or psychological impairment" is defined as "an
impairment of any system of the body. ' 31 This definition covers
both physical and mental injury.

B. Introduction No. 400
Int. No. 400 is legislation that would, if enacted, create a new
protected class of domestic violence victims for purposes of the
Human Rights Law protecting against unlawful employment discrimination. The first draft of the bill, on which most of the discussion in this article will be based, reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Victims of Domestic Violence. (a) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer, or an employee or agent
thereof, to refuse to hire or employ an individual or to discharge
from employment or to discriminate against in compensation or
other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment an individual because of the actual or perceived status of such individual
as a victim of domestic violence.32
The legislation defines "victim of domestic violence" as:
any person who is the victim of an act which would constitute a
violation of the penal law, including, but not limited to acts constituting disorderly conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, kidnapping, assault, or attempted murder; and (i)
such act or acts have resulted in an actual physical or emotional
injury or have created a substantial risk of physical or emotional
harm to such person; and (ii) such act or acts are or are alleged
to have been committed by a family or household member,
which shall mean a person related by blood or marriage; a person who is legally married to the victim of domestic violence, or
who is such victim's domestic partner; a person formerly married to the victim of domestic violence, or who was the victim's
domestic partner regardless of whether such person still resides
in the same household as the victim of domestic violence; a person who has a child in common with the victim of domestic violence, regardless of whether such person is or was married or
has lived together with such victim of domestic violence at any
time; an unrelated person who is continually or at regular intervals living in the same household as the victim of domestic violence or who has in the past continually or at regular intervals
lived in such same household; or a person unrelated to the victim of domestic violence who has had intimate or continuous
31. Id. § 8-102.16(b)(1) & (2).
32. Int. No. 400, supra note 13, § 2.
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social contact with such victim and who has access to such victim's household.3 3

C. Application/Enforcement of the Proposed Legislation
There are those who believe that the symbolic effect of a particular piece of legislation is as important, or nearly as important, as its
practical consequences because it signifies a recognition of the ascendance of a traditionally disadvantaged group. Consequently,
proponents argue that the disadvantaged group benefits from the
power elite's recognition that the status quo is changing.
Laws outlawing discrimination on the basis of membership in a
protected class - usually referred to as "minority group members"34 - may appear to reflect this thinking. Nevertheless, many
laws outlawing discrimination were not merely symbolic indicia of
progress. These laws were wedded to powerful and dynamic enforcement mechanisms that changed American society. 35 The success of civil rights laws in addressing discrimination in public
accommodations and housing and employment on the basis of race
is rooted largely in the enforcement power aligned behind them.36
33. Id. § 2(b).
34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (outlawing deprivation of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws by a state actor).
35. See Jack E. White, Martin Luther King, Jr., in PEOPLE OF THE CENTURY 354,
355 (1999). The federal laws desegregating public accommodations were the culmination of the bus boycotts and lunch counter sit-ins in the South which galvanized
American opinion in favor of desegregation of public accommodations and led the
way to other reforms:
Even after the Supreme Court struck down segregation in 1954, what the
world now calls human rights offenses were both law and custom in much of
America. Before [Martin Luther] King and his movement, a tired and thoroughly respectable Negro seamstress like Rosa Parks could be thrown into
jail and fined simply because she refused to give up her seat on an Alabama
bus so a white man could sit down... Even highly educated blacks were
routinely denied the right to vote or serve on juries. They could not eat at
lunch counters, register in motels, or use whites-only rest rooms; they could
not buy or rent a home wherever they chose. In some rural enclaves in the
South, they were even compelled to get off the sidewalk and stand in the
street if a Caucasian walked by.
Id. The original focus of enforcement mechanisms have shifted because, although
public accommodation suits are still brought, most advocates today are concentrating
on employment and housing discrimination.
36. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress, acting with its
discretion and judgment, has the power under the commerce clause to ban racial discrimination. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 277 (1964)
(reviewing the constitutionality of Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964). For a local
enforcement perspective, see Marta B. Varela, The Effectiveness of Equal Treatment
in Employment: the Human Rights Law of New York City, in NON-DISCRIMINATION
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Therefore, it is a fundamental premise of this Article that any proposal for the extension of a legal right to a newly-defined minority
group must establish the workability of the enforcement mechanism and its consistency with established enforcement mechanisms,
or else be consigned to the ash heap.
Int. No. 400 is legislation that would, if enacted, create a new
protected class of domestic violence victims. Int. No. 400 would
require the New York City Commission on Human Rights (the
"Commission"), which enforces the City's Human Rights Law, to
determine whether the person filing a complaint is a "domestic violence victim. '37 In all cases, the proposed legislation would require
the Commission to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the
employee is the victim of conduct that "would constitute a violation of the penal law. ' ' 38 Once the Commission makes such a determination, the Commission would then need to decide if the
employer or its agents discriminated against the domestic violence
victim. The victim's employer is prohibited from discriminating
against the victim because of the victim's actual or perceived status
as a victim of domestic violence. 39 As a result, Int. No. 400 would
confer on the Commission the authority to determine, in the absence of a criminal conviction, or even a protective order, whether
the complainant has been the victim of a criminal act committed by
someone with whom she has an intimate relationship. District Attorney's offices in the five boroughs would likely see the exercise of
such authority by the Commission as a usurpation of their prerogatives. In addition, it is highly unlikely that the Commission could
compel the alleged perpetrator of domestic violence to testify concerning his alleged criminal acts.
Because Int. No. 400 would be enforced by the Commission, any
reasoned analysis of the benefits that might inure to domestic violence victims must evaluate the practicalities of giving special status
to domestic violence victims. Specifically, there must be an evaluation of whether the new enforcement burdens that would be placed
on the Commission could be discharged effectively. If the law cannot be effectively enforced, legislating a fourteenth protected class
into Human Rights Law will be nothing more than an empty show.
LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

339 (Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodriques eds.,

1999) (analyzing how much societal change can be attributed to New York City laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of protected class).
37. See Int. No. 400, supra note 13, § 2.
38. Id.

39. See id. § 1.
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Int. No. 400 is offered to provide domestic violence victims with
recourse against an employer who discriminates against them because they are domestic violence victims. 40 By its very framework,

however, this proposed legislation actually impedes the goals it sets
out to achieve on behalf of domestic violence victims. A complaint
based on a claim that has no supporting judgment from a state
criminal court boldly illustrates the perils of the legislation.
In the absence of a criminal conviction and a supporting record
establishing that (1) the complainant was the victim of a crime; and
(2) the perpetrator and his victim had had an intimate relationship,
on what basis should the agency determine that an act which would
constitute a violation of the penal law took place between them?
Int. No. 400 will naturally lead employer-respondents to challenge
the agency's authority to so determine, in the absence of a criminal
conviction or a protective order. Employers will also argue that by
not requiring the domestic violence victim to produce a criminal
judgement or protective order, the proposed legislation's actual effect is to inhibit employers from helping domestic violence victims
and focuses employers instead on defensive strategies to avoid frivolous complaints lodged by defendants colluding with domestic
partners to punish employers.
In the case where there is a protective order or a criminal conviction and supporting documentation establishing the intimate relationship between the complainant and the object of the criminal
sanction, the existence of domestic violence in the employee's life
is not in question. Whether a discrimination framework is the best
one to encourage employers to assist domestic violence victims,
however, is.
Assume for the moment that: 1) an employer learns that an employee is being victimized by a present or former intimate; 2) the
employer rejects the employee's request for assistance, such as a
change in her work schedule; and, 3) the employer acts adversely
towards the employee. It is certainly deplorable that an employer
would behave in such a way solely because an employee is being
victimized, but it is also hard to believe. Any employer who has
been satisfied with the performance of an employee will be loath to
terminate or take other adverse action against her, because old and
new employees are not fungible. Recruitment of new employees is
time-consuming and training drains the bottom line. Moreover, if
an employer intentionally discriminates against a domestic violence
40. See id.
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victim, that employee already has a cause of action for disability, as
discussed in Part III below. 4 '
III.

ARGUMENT -

DUPLICATION OF REMEDIES

Unlike discrimination that originates in the workplace, where
the employer can reasonably be said to be a prime influence in
sustaining or inhibiting the activity, domestic violence takes place
outside of it. If there is subsequent workplace discrimination
against a domestic violence victim, then the provisions of the
Human Rights Law that ban discrimination based on disability already prohibit any such discrimination.42 Under the Human Rights
Law, any injury, whether psychological or physical, suffices for the
filing
of a complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of disability. 43 Further, the Human Rights Law requires the employer to
accommodate the disability unless the employer can satisfy the
court that to do so would constitute an undue hardship to the
employer.
Advocates for the enactment of legislation of a "domestic violence victim" protected class argue that there are domestic violence
victims unmarked by any physical or psychological disability as a
result of the violence, and that those victims will be left unprotected and could be discriminated against without this legislation.45
In addition to aiding this atypical group of domestic violence victims, the proposed legislation would also presumably bring within
its ambit those stigmatized by the perception that they are domestic violence victims. 46 Thus, the legislation's proponents argue that
the legislation will close the loophole in coverage not addressed by
the current disability law framework.47
In other words, advocates for the "domestic violence victim"
protected class believe there is a gap in protection from discrimination that works to the disadvantage of those domestic violence victims who are physically or psychologically unscathed.48
Furthermore, advocates assert that the law in its current state
leaves remediless individuals wrongly perceived to be domestic violence victims and discriminated against on account of that percep41. See infra Part III; see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107.
42. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (1996).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. § 8-102(16)(a) & (b).
id. § 8-102(18).
Int. No. 400, supra note 13, § 1.
id.
id.
id.
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tion.4 9 If there is no physical or psychological injury of any kind,

how are these individuals victims? If, as advocates maintain, there
are domestic violence victims with psychological and physical injuries, and who will neither approach police nor the courts, then what
meaningful accommodation could the addition of a special protected class that simply mimics protections already provided under
the disability rubric add? Of course, the inefficiency of a duplicative filing aside, in those cases where there is documentation of
physical or psychological disability, what victim would be properly
advised not to avail herself of its broad protections on account of
the injury to her dignity implied in being a claimant under the disability category?
This leaves only the case in which the employer took adverse
employment action against the employee for perceiving her
(rightly or wrongly) to be a domestic violence victim. These reasons do not, in the last analysis, constitute a compelling rationale
for the legislation of a protected class of domestic violence victims.
The danger of the proposed legislation is that it permits an employee to make an allegation against an employer that may or may
not be true and that need not be substantiated. Therefore, the proposed legislation in effect compels employers to take an adversarial
view of the domestic violence victim rather than encouraging accommodations that could help them.5 °
Even though analysis reveals the weakness of the legislation, if a
domestic violence victim protected class is enacted, any domestic
violence victim with physical or psychological injuries will certainly
file both a disability and a domestic violence victim claim. Despite
this duplication, proponents of the proposed legislation strenuously
insist that it will address a gap in coverage under disability law. It
is therefore instructive to examine their claim that there is a class
of domestic violence victims for which the disability protected class
provides no protection.
A.

Refusal To Hire

Any applicant for a job who shows physical signs of possible domestic violence - bruising on exposed areas of the skin being the
most obvious - sends a signal to an employer that there may be a
disability issue. It may be assumed, for the sake of the discussion,
that an employer who is familiar with the federal, state and local
49. See id.
50. See id.
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laws5' prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability and will
not commit disability discrimination in the course of the hiring
process.
As a legal matter, therefore, for a domestic violence victim complainant who makes no claim of disability to prevail in her domestic violence victim action, she would have to be able to prove
either: (a) that her employer refused her an accommodation not
required by the disability law, but that would be required under the
domestic violence victim category; or (b) that only her domestic
violence victim status, or, the perception that she is a domestic violence victim, motivated the employer's adverse employment action
against her.52
In the first case, not to be overlooked is the possibility that an
employer could be obliged to provide accommodations for domestic violence victim employees that the employer would not have to
provide under the disability framework. This raises troubling questions as to whether a judge might read the proscription on disability discrimination to require employers to install new security
systems built for the protection of a single employee.
The second case is unlikely to arise because the disability law's
proscriptions have conditioned most employers not to ask questions about anything not strictly related to the work to be done.53
Whatever the employer thinks caused the bruises displayed, the
employer will keep his own counsel. Therefore, the only way the
employer could learn the reason for the obvious signs of injury is if
the applicant communicates the fact to the employer herself. The
foregoing is also true with respect to domestic violence victim applicants bearing no outward signs of abuse. An employer will naturally be circumspect in response to the disclosure of a domestic
violence problem, and if the domestic violence victim is not hired,
the employer may anticipate the possibility of a discrimination suit.
Let us examine the instance where an employer's representative
in the hiring process does make a remark that indicates a bias
against domestic violence victims. The damages issue aside, such a
case is aberrational since the preponderant number of filers will
have physical and/or mental disabilities. Therefore, most employers named as respondents could also be named as respondents
51. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117

(1994); N.Y.

EXEC.

LAW

§ 296 (McKinney 1998); N.Y.C.

(1996).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112; N.Y.C. ADMIN.
53. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d); N.Y.C.

CODE

ADMIN. CODE

§ 8-107(a).
§ 8-107.

ADMIN. CODE

§ 8-107
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under a disability framework. The only reason for a "domestic violence victim" category in such cases appears to be to provide domestic violence victims a way to seek damages against an employer
for failing to accommodate them without having to make the claim
on the basis of disabled status.
In the case of the putatively non-disabled domestic violence victim, because there will be no claim for a workplace accommodation
based on a disability caused by the violence, there are two possible
underlying theories that would support such a claim. The first
would be based on the employer's unresponsiveness to the domestic violence victim's request for an accommodation having to do
with her physical safety. The other theory would be a claim for
compensatory damages for adverse employment actions taken
against the survivor solely on the basis of her status as a domestic
violence victim.
In the first case, the claim of lack of accommodation would
oblige the court to determine whether a complainant is not entitled
to an accommodation because it constitutes an "undue hardship,"
as provided in the disability law.54 In the second case, the "stigma"
theory, in the absence of an uncorroborated remark about a victim's status, it will be difficult to prove that the employer took the
adverse action complained of because the complainant was a domestic violence victim or perceived to be one. It will be difficult to
sever one cause of action from the other when this cause of action
is coupled with a disability claim. This is indicative of the legislation's redundancy.
In addition, if some percentage of the employer population is
found to have engaged in discrimination against domestic violence
victims and is compelled to pay out damages based on the income
that would have been earned and the psychological injury implied
by the rejection, will the institution of monetary penalties against
the employer actually impede the likelihood of domestic violence?
Clearly not. Furthermore, it is difficult to analogize discrimination
against domestic violence victims to discrimination based on race,
gender or national origin because proponents of the legislation admit they want accommodations for domestic violence, just as advocates for the disabled do.
Opponents of the legislation do not question the need for employers to accommodate domestic violence victims. Rather, they
point out two things. First, the disability laws already provide pow54. See N.Y.C.

ADMIN. CODE

§ 8-102(18).
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erful protections for domestic violence victims. Second, the disability laws provide a framework within which the most adversarial
aspects of disagreements between employers and employees can be
navigated by educating employers to their existing obligations;
rather than by creating a new protected class for them to worry
about.
B. Security Concerns
The proposed legislation does not, as the disability law does, require employers to provide employees with a reasonable accommodation. Rather, it prohibits discrimination against domestic
violence victims, while not specifying anything other than a regime
of monetary compensation for refusal to hire, terminate, or fail to
supply the domestic violence victim with benefits comparable to
those being generally enjoyed by other co-workers.
While the
Human Rights Law provides for, in addition to compensatory damages, injunctive relief and civil penalties as additional remedies,56
whether an employer could be compelled to provide any accommodations to the domestic violence victim on the basis of the proposed legislation alone is open to question.
Under a disability framework, an employer could be required to
accommodate an employee with a psychological or physical disability caused by domestic violence. 57 Significantly, it would be available without requiring the Commission to determine whether the
third-party perpetrator's conduct would constitute a violation of
the penal law, thereby facilitating the incentive for employers to
provide the accommodation requested.
For instance, if an employee reports that whenever her ex-husband calls, she experiences panic attacks and requests that her employer instruct the switchboard operator not to put the calls
through, such a request would fit squarely within the framework of
the disability law.58 There is another advantage to using the disability framework: the disability law requires employers to maintain
confidentiality regarding the employee's disability. 9 The proposed
legislation, on the other hand, requires the employee to disclose to
55.
56.
57.
58.

N.Y.C.

See Int. No. 400, supra note 13, § 2.
See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-125.
See Int. No. 400, supra note 13; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107.
The panic attacks would fit in The Human Rights Law as a disability. See
ADMIN. CODE

§ 8-102(16).

59. While confidentiality is not covered by the Human Rights Law, the Americans
with Disabilities Act requires the employer to keep the employee's disability confidential. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
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the employer not only the accommodation required, but also the
domestic violence scenario that gave rise to the need for it.
Domestic violence discrimination, as characterized in the legislation, is like racial or national origin discrimination in employment;
like treating domestic violence victims differently from other applicants or employees, solely on the basis of their status as a domestic
violence victims. The remedy, as provided by the proposed legislation, is compensatory, in line with theories about remedies for discrimination based on race, national origin and gender, which seek
to incentivize employers to treat equally all equally qualified applicants and employees, even though they belong to different protected classes. In disability discrimination, however, as with
discrimination based on creed, the remedy is to provide special
treatment to the member of the protected class. By its terms, the
proposed legislation seeks to make employers treat domestic violence victims like everyone else - when arguably they need the
special treatment that the disability protected class already makes
available to them.
The need for preservation of the employee's confidentiality is
also not to be underestimated. While under the disability framework, the employee may disclose that calls from her former husband make her so nervous she has had to see a psychiatrist who
says she is suffering from "panic attacks," she need not disclose to
the employer exactly why, and may still receive the benefit of the
requested accommodation.
In sum, by creating an adversarial relationship between the domestic violence victim and the employer, the proposed legislation
would actually discourage an employer from making an independent judgment about the individual and instead, force the employer
to take a defensive posture towards an employee's disclosure of the
details of domestic violence. The proposed legislation is an effort
to help domestic violence victims but it will do nothing substantive
to change patterns of domestic violence and will drain off agency
resources that could be better applied in other ways. Unlike the
changes wrought by the laws prohibiting discrimination in public
accommodations, housing and employment, the legislation scapegoats employers without advancing progress against domestic violence. The legislation is, therefore, in addition to its infelicities as a
matter of public policy, deeply flawed as a legal matter.
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IV.

INTRODUCTION

No. 400-A - THE NEW

REVISION AND

RECENT ACTIVITY

A. The Advocates' Perspective
Advocates are unswayed by the foregoing arguments. 60 Their
chief concern is illustrated by the following example, wherein the
disability analysis would not protect a domestic violence victim,
and the proposed legislation would:
Hypothetical
A working woman who terminated her abusive relationship five
years ago is tracked down to her place of work by the former boyfriend. The boyfriend starts making pestering calls to the woman
at her place of work. The woman speaks to her employer about
the situation, requesting the accommodation of receiving a new telephone number. Her employer, fearful that the ex-boyfriend
might be a threat to his workplace, fires the woman.
Under such a scenario, the advocates point out (and the Commission on Human Rights agrees) that the working woman is not
going to be able file a complaint with the Human Rights Commission for having been denied a reasonable accommodation under
the City's law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.
B.

The Labor and Employment Committee of the Bar
Association of the City of New York

Advocates brought their campaign on behalf of Int. No. 400 to
the Labor and Employment Committee of the Bar Association of
the City of New York. After hearing presentations from its committees regarding a relevant piece of legislation a committee has
earmarked for consideration by the Bar, the Bar Association may
formally endorse legislation it believes will reasonably serve the
public interest. For that reason, advocates arranged a meeting with
the Labor and Employment Law Committee at which they would
make a presentation and take questions from the Committee's
members. The Committee heard the presentation and discussed
60. A joint hearing on Int. No. 400-A was held by the General Welfare and the
Committee on Wednesday, January 26, 2000. Advocates for the legislation testified
extensively. The Mayor's Office of City Legislative Affairs, which acts as the Mayor's
spokesman on city legislative matters, submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to the
legislation in lieu of testimony. As of January 27, 2000, the transcript of those hearings was in preparation as a public document. A copy of the transcript will be deposited with the Council's legislative offices at City Hall. The telephone number for the
office of the Chief, Legislative Document Unit, Stephen C. Stark, is (212) 788-7104.
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the proposed legislation. At this time, however, the Bar Association has not taken a public position on the bill.
City Council Revisions Embodied in Int. No. 400-A
Like any legislative body, in the early life of a legislative proposal, the City Council of the City of New York will incorporate comments from interested parties whose views it shares that will
eliminate any errors in draftsmanship, including ambiguities, contradictions and omissions.
The City Council, working alongside the advocates, revised the
language of the August 6, 1998 draft and issued a new draft bill, Int.
No. 400-A, on January 26, 2000.61 In addition to amending the language to the proposed new section of the Human Rights Law, the
new draft bill replaced the preamble preceding section 2, regarding
legislative findings and intent.62 However, because that language
will not be incorporated into the Human Rights Law, it need not
concern us here, and the balance of the article will analyze the language of the proposed new section 8-107.21 of the Human Rights
Law.
Section 2 of Int. No. 400-A, the section of the bill that would
amend the Human Rights law to add "domestic violence victim" as
a protected class, contains a typographical error would should be
pointed out at the outset. The old section 2 states that "Section 8107 of the administrative code of the city of New York, is amended
C.

by adding a new subdivision 21, to read as follows ...

The new

section 2 of Int. No. 400-A states that "Title 8 of the administrative
code of the city of New York is amended by adding a new section
8-107.1 which shall read as follows ...
The drafters might have meant that Title 8 of the administrative
code should be amended by adding a new section 8-107.21, because
adding this section of Int. No. 400-A as section 8-107.1 would cause
this language to precede and supplant the current 8-107.1, which
introduces the concept of unlawful discriminatory practices in employment.65 There is no reason why the drafters of the revised bill
61. See Int. No. 400-A, supra note 15. The relevant sections of the August 6, 1998
version of the bill are set forth infra in Appendix A. The relevant sections of the
January 26, 2000 draft are set forth infra in Appendix B.
62. Compare Int. No. 400, supra note 13, Legislative Intent and Findings, with Int.
No. 400-A, supra note 15, Legislative Findings and Intent.
63. See Int. No. 400, supra note 13, § 2.
64. See Int. No. 400-A, supra note 15, § 2.
65. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (1996) ("[section] 8-107 unlawful discriminatory practices. 1. Employment. It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice...").
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would have to subvert the order of the law as currently printed to
achieve their goals, so it is reasonable to suppose that the enumeration in the second draft of Int. No. 400 is due to a typographical
error.
The new draft takes subsection (b), which defines "victim of domestic violence" and moves the subsection to the beginning of the
section, as appropriate for the definitional section of a piece of legislation. Are there any changes to the definition of domestic violence victim? Let us compare the text, phrase by phrase.
First, the old draft of Int. No. 400 defines "victim of domestic
violence" as a "person who is the victim of an act which would
constitute a violation of the penal law .... 66 The new draft, Int.
No. 400-A, states:
§ 8-107.1 Victims of Domestic Violence. 1. Definitions. Whenever used in this section the following terms shall have the following meanings:
a. "Acts or threats of violence" shall include. But not be limited
67
to, acts which would constitute violations of the penal law.
The revision has made it explicit that the Commission need not
limit the complaints from putative domestic violence victims to acts
that are manifestly violations of the penal law as in the first draft.
Second, the old draft of Int. No. 400 defined the acts that constitute domestic violence by citing examples. 68 For example, it stated
that "'victim of domestic violence' shall be defined as any person
who is the victim of any act which would constitute a violation of
the penal law, including, but not limited to acts constituting disorderly conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, kidnapping, assault or attempted murder....
Setting aside for a
moment the philosophical arguments made against legislating a
"domestic violence victim" protected class, the revised draft of the
bill embodied in Int. No. 400-A, is, as a matter of draftsmanship,
inferior to the first on account of its vagueness. Int. No. 400-A now
includes threats that may not constitute violations of the penal
law. 70 Thus, the net effect of the legislation is that there are no
criteria under which the Commission could reject a complaint from
an individual, whereas under the earlier draft it could exercise
some discretion in determining whether to assert jurisdiction. Be66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Int.
Int.
See
Id.
See

No. 400, supra note 13, § 2.
No. 400-A, supra note 15, § 2.
Int. No. 400, supra note 13, § 2.
Int. No. 400-A, supra note 15, § 2.
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cause it is the employer that is the "bad guy" named in the complaint, it is clear that the proposed legislation, if enacted, can be
used to harass them with impunity. This is because the Commission will not be able to turn away those borderline cases, but will
have to investigate the nature of the employer's conduct, where
under the stricter definition, the complainant's assertion of domestic violence would have to point to some affirmative act that can be
likened to disorderly conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, kidnapping, assault, or attempted murder. Effectively, under the revised Int. No. 400-A, the employee's request for
accommodation, however flimsily supported - as in the case of
requests based on putative "threats" - triggers the employer's liability for failure to accommodate.
Third, the new legislation also provides no guidance as to when a
complainant can no longer be considered a domestic violence victim. In the hypothetical of the woman who broke off with her
abuser five years ago, while it is true that she could not hold her
employer liable for failing to accommodate her under the disability
law, is it good public policy to continue to impose an obligation on
an employer on the basis of a claim deriving from the alleged psychological after-shocks of domestic violence that occurred five
years ago?
The remaining portion of Int. No. 400-A emphasizes that threats
of violence can be sufficient to trigger coverage under the law,71
and reiterates the prohibition on discrimination against domestic
violence victims.7" The new draft also arguably narrows the potential list of persons who could be considered perpetrators of domestic violence by excluding persons whose "contact" with the victim
is (exclusive of the violence) social and continuous, if not
intimate.73
71. See id. (stating "b. "Victim of domestic violence" shall mean a person who has
been subjected to acts or threats of violence .... ").
72. See id. (stating "2. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer, or an agent thereof, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from
employment, or to discriminate against an individual in compensation or other terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of the actual or perceived status of
said individual as a victim of domestic violence.").
73. Compare Int. No. 400, supra note 13, § 2, proposed as § 8-107.21(b)(ii), with
Int. No. 400-A, supra note 15, to become § 8-107.1.b (actually § 8-107.21.b, as discussed above). The old draft, Int. No. 400, states that the perpetrator can be:
a family or household member, which shall mean a person related by blood
or marriage; which shall mean a person related by blood or marriage; a person who is legally married to the victim of domestic violence, or who is such
victim's domestic partner; a person formerly married to the victim of domestic violence, or who was the victim's domestic partner regardless of whether
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The Administration's Position on Int. No. 400-A

The Giuliani administration opposes the enactment of Int. No.
400-A in its latest draft and has filed a Memorandum in Opposition.14 The "Reasons for Opposition" allude to some of the arguments raised against the bill in this article. However, another
argument is also raised, which bears directly on the definitional issue that has such significance for employers, as well as the Commission. The relevant section of the Memorandum of Opposition
states it as follows:
While the Administration applauds the Council's efforts and
concern with the problem of domestic violence, this legislation is
problematic and discriminatory in that it does not go far enough
in protecting the victims of all serious crimes. Furthermore, this
bill may serve to dilute protections currently afforded the victims of domestic violence under the Human rights law. It is
clear from this administration's efforts and record on domestic
violence, and its support of domestic violence legislation at all
levels of government, that we would support any measure that
offers real promise of preventing domestic violence and helping
its victims. This bill does not meet this standard.
The bill would create an unwise precedent in the law by conferring a unique status upon the victims of a particular crime. No
one would disagree that victims of domestic violence deserve to
such person still resides in the same household as the victim of domestic
violence; a person who has a child in common with the victim of domestic

violence, regardless of whether such person is or was married or has lived
together with such victim of domestic violence at any time; an unrelated person who is continually or at regular intervals living in the same household as
the victim of domestic violence or who has in the past continually or at regular intervals lived in such same household; or a person unrelated the victim
of domestic violence who has had intimate or continuous social contact with
such victim and who has access to such victim's household.
Int. No. 400, supra note 13, § 2. The new subsection of Int. No. 400-A reads:
a current or former spouse of the victim, by a person with whom the victim
shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim, by a person who is or has been in a continuing social
relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim, or a person
who is or has continually or at regular intervals lived in the same household
as the victim.
Int. No. 400-A, supra note 15, § 2.
74. See Memorandum in Opposition of the City of New York, Office of the Mayor
[hereinafter Mem. Opp.]. The Mem. Opp. has been deposited with the Council's legislative offices at City Hall. The telephone number for the office of the Chief, Legislative Document Unit, Stephen C. Stark, is (212) 788-7104.
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be protected from job discrimination. But why shouldn't
the
75
victims of other crimes enjoy the same protections?

In other words, assuming it is possible that some employers will
terminate employees requesting accommodations who have had
the misfortune to be victims of the crime of domestic violence, why
should the burdens of being a domestic violence victim entitle that
victim to more rights than the victim of a rape by a stranger?
The argument is not so much about which victims are most deserving of special treatment under law, as it is about whether providing domestic violence victims with a special status under the law
is the best way to help them, and whether the burdens imposed on
employers by conferring special rights under the law on the basis of
their victimhood really makes sense, particularly when the employer is not the direct perpetrator of the violence on the victims.
CONCLUSION

When existing legal structures can serve to protect broadly the
rights of several classes of persons, it serves no goal of public policy
to enact legislation that redundantly provides another basis of protection to an already adequately protected group. As a matter of
public policy, it is in fact inefficient to enact such legislation. What
is more, the practical effect of such legislation can only be to mire
lawyers and judges in thorny attempts to interpret it correctly.
75. Id. Other relevant portions of the Mem. Opp. reads as follows:
A brief example is in order. suppose that on the same night, two different
women are raped or assaulted, and both suffer identical, serious . But one is
attacked by her husband, and the other is attacked by a stranger. Under this
bill, only the woman attacked by her husband would be entitled to anti-discrimination protection...
By protecting only one class of crime victims, this bill effectively discriminates against all other victims. It is therefore unfair, and counterproductive.
Moreover, this bill jeopardizes victims' privacy. The current Human Rights
Law bars discrimination based on any physical, medical, mental or psychological impairment. Thus domestic violence victims who are in any way impaired because of the crimes they've suffered are protected and granted the
right to seek accommodations. Importantly, the current law does not require those seeking accommodations to disclose the cause of their impairments. That is, victims are not forced to reveal personal and highly sensitive
information. They need only provide employers with documentation of their
physical or mental impairments. Under the proposed legislation, however,
employees would be forced to identify themselves as domestic violence victims in order to seek an accommodation or file a grievance. Legislation requiring domestic violence victims to divulge this deeply personal and
sensitive information is burdensome and intrusive.
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The enactment of a "domestic violence victim" protected class as
an addition to the Human Rights Law would constitute such a legislative enactment. Domestic violence victims are already served
under the disability-protected class on account of the city's overarching definition of disability, including as it does any physical or
psychological disability. To attempt to grant domestic violence victims more by legislating a protected class just for them, is a misguided effort which, if brought to fruition, will only raise the
expectations of domestic violence victims without exceeding the
protections they already enjoy under the city's disability law, as
well as unfairly punish employers.
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A

LOCAL LAW

To amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to employment discrimination against domestic violence
victims.
Be it enacted by the Council as follows:
Section 1. Declaration of legislative intent and findings. The
persuasiveness of domestic violence in the City of New York cannot be ignored. New York Police Department statistics show that
although the overall crime rate in 1997 was down nine percent and
the murder rate was down twenty-three percent, rapes and assaults
connected with domestic violence increased eight and nine percent
respectively, and so-called "domestic violence murders" increased
thirteen percent.
While the criminal justice system has focused on new ways to
protect victims and punish abusers, little attention has been paid to
the economic security of the victims which is often drastically and
negatively affected by their condition as abused individuals. It is
important to recognize that a domestic violence victim's ability to
work and support herself and her children (over ninety percent of
domestic violence victims are women) is crucial to whether or not a
victim is able to escape an abusive relationship.
New York State Labor Department statistics reflect the scope of
the problem. Individual acts of domestic violence occur more frequently than muggings, rapes and automobile accidents combined.
Such statistics indicate the devastating effect domestic violence has
on a victim's access to employment opportunities. Seventy-four
percent of employed battered women are harassed by their abusers
on the job and seventy-five percent of domestic violence victims
must use company time to call for medical and legal services, shelters or counselors, or to talk with family and friends, out of fear of
doing so at home. Additionally, United States Department of Labor statistics reveal that homicide is the leading cause of death for
women on the job, and that ex-partners commit fifty percent of the
workplace homicides. Furthermore one study conducted indicates
that over one-half of the women surveyed who were in abusive relationships stayed with their abusers because they lacked the resources to support themselves and their children.
Studies have also shown that between twenty-four and thirty
percent of battered women surveyed had lost their job, at least in
part, due to domestic violence. Anecdotal reports indicate that
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some employers have taken adverse action against the employee,
including termination, demotion, suspension, involuntary transfer,
or loss of pay and/or benefits. Others are reported to have fired or
suspended employees when they showed the physical "signs" of
abuse at home, citing "worker moral" as justification for denying
the employee the work she is capable of performing. Domestic violence victims also lose jobs because employers refuse to grant time
off from work so that the victim can obtain an order of protection
or attend a civil or criminal proceeding against the perpetrator.
Many of the devastating consequences to victims of domestic violence could often be avoided without placing undue hardship on
business operations by simple steps taken by employers, such as
moving a work desk or changing a phone extension, to ensure
safety and to avoid harassment of the victims. The Council finds
that this local law protecting the employment rights of domestic
violence victims is essential to ensure that employers do take these
reasonable steps to guarantee the safety of domestic violence victims. The attainment of this protection will afford domestic violence victims the opportunity to be productive individuals and to
achieve economic security for themselves and their families.
This local law addresses many of the problems domestic violence
victim face at the workplace by making it unlawful for an employer
to take discriminatory action against an employee based on that
employee's actual or perceived status as a victim of domestic
violence.
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B

LOCAL LAW

To amend the administrative code of the city of New York, to prohibit employment discrimination against victims of domestic
violence.
Be it enacted by the Council as follows:
Section 1. Legislative findings and intent. The City Council
finds and declares that domestic violence is a widely recognized
problem in New York City. Indeed New York City Police Department Statistics indicate that although the overall crime rate has decreased in recent years, incidents of domestic violence have
increased. However, little attention has been paid to the impact of
domestic violence on the work lives of victims and on the City
economy as a whole. In recent years, a growing body of evidence
has documented the devastating impact of domestic violence on
the ability of victims - over 90% of whom are women - to partici-

pate fully in the economy. Yet a victim's capacity to escape an abusive relationship is dependent in large part on economic factors
such as finding and keeping a job and gaining economic security
and independence. One study found that over one half of women
surveyed who were victims of domestic violence stayed with their
abusers because they lacked alternative resources with which to
support themselves and their children. Other studies have determined that between twenty-four and fifty-two percent of battered
women surveyed had lost their jobs at least in part due to domestic
violence, which included harassment by the batterers both on and
off the job.
Employers are also affected by domestic violence. It has been
estimated that absenteeism caused by domestic violence costs the
nation's employers between three and five billion dollars annually.
In a survey conducted by Roper Starch Worldwide for the Women's Work Program at Liz Claiborne, Inc. forty percent of the
senior executives at Fortune 1000 companies surveyed reported
that domestic violence had a harmful effect on their company's
productivity, and sixty-six percent believed that their company's financial performance would benefit by addressing the issue. In response, several corporations have established policies and
programs to assist employees struggling with domestic violence,
and the State of New York has enacted legislation, that established
an executive office to develop model domestic violence policies for
counties, state agencies and private employers, as well as an advi-
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sory council to develop strategies for domestic violence prevention.
(N.Y. Exec. Law Section 575). Further, the State of Maine has
enacted legislation requiring employers to provide unpaid leaves of
absence to victims of domestic violence, and similar legislation has
been enacted in the City of Miami and is pending in the State of
Pennsylvania.
Because they are embarrassed or because they fear losing their
jobs, victims are often reticent about informing their employers
about incidents of domestic violence or about requesting simple
accommodations that might assist them in fulfilling their job duties.
A growing body of anecdotal evidence suggests that the fear of
negative employment actions such as demotion, suspension, loss of
pay and/or benefits or termination against employees who have revealed that they are victims of domestic violence is not unwarranted. For example, victims of domestic violence have been
terminated or demoted after requesting simple protective measures
such as time off or flexible hours to confer with an attorney or a
domestic violence counselor, obtaining order of protection or obtain medical or other services for themselves or other family
members.
The City Council finds that it is in the best interests of the City of
New York to protect the economic viability of victims of domestic
violence and to support their efforts to gain independence from
their abusers. Victims of domestic violence who are receiving medical treatment or therapy for the physical and/or psychological effects of domestic violence may be covered under the disability
provisions of sections 8-102(16) and 8-107 of the Human Rights
Law. However, not all victims of domestic violence need or obtain
such treatment and would therefore not be considered disabled.
Further many victims of domestic violence do not consider themselves disabled.
Accordingly, the Council further finds that in order to enable
victims of domestic violence to speak with their employers without
fear of reprisal, about a domestic violence incident or about possible steps that will enhance their ability to perform their job without
causing undue hardship to the employer, the Human Rights Law
should be amended to provide employment protection for New
Yorkers who are actual or perceived victims of domestic violence.

